



INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND THE TE AWA TUPUA 
(WHANGANUI RIVER CLAIMS SETTLEMENT) ACT 2017 IN 
AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
Fluid Personality 
TONI COLLINS* AND SHEA ESTERLING† 
In March 2017, the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) (‘Te 
Awa Tupua Act’) became the first piece of legislation in the world to declare a river a legal 
person. Through this grant of legal personality the Whanganui River acquires the rights, duties, 
powers and liabilities of an entity with legal standing including the ability to sue those who harm 
it. This legislation is aimed at reconciling the relationship between the government of Aotearoa 
New Zealand and its Indigenous peoples (Māori) in light of the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, one of the founding documents of Aotearoa New Zealand. However, the Te Awa Tupua 
Act also offers a platform to explore the promotion and protection of Indigenous rights in 
international human rights law including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous peoples in relation to Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand. This inquiry demonstrates 
that despite the novelty of the legislation and the exciting progress towards re-establishing Māori 
governance and management over the River that they held for centuries before European 
colonisation, the innovative grant of legal personality to a river does not fully address past 
wrongs in that it continues to exclude Māori ownership of freshwater. Ultimately the Te Awa 
Tupua Act leaves Aotearoa New Zealand wanting in its commitments under international human 
rights law. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The use of legal devices to protect natural resources is not new; there is a 
convergence of decisions across a divergent range of jurisdictions which, with 
varying degrees of success, have endowed natural resources with legal 
personality. In 2008 and 2009 Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively, declared nature 
to be a legal person at a constitutional level.1 Further North, in 2010 Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania in the United States followed suit.2 In 2014, the government of 
New Zealand declared the Te Urewera National Park a legal person.3 In 
November 2016, the Constitutional Court of Colombia declared the Atrato River 
to be a legal person, and at the end of March 2017 the High Court in the State of 
Uttarakhand in India declared an ecosystem including glaciers, lakes, forests and 
wetlands to have legal personality and also granted personality to the Ganges and 
Yamuna Rivers.4 It has not, however, been smooth sailing. More recently in the 
United States, a lawsuit filed by an environmental group asking a judge to grant 
the same rights as a person to the Colorado River was dismissed with prejudice 
in December 2017.5 The lawyer in the suit was threatened by the Attorney-
General’s office that his firm would be liable for financial penalties and that he 
could be subject to disbarment on the basis that the case was unlawful and 
frivolous.6 
However, the first piece of legislation in the world to declare a river a legal 
person was enacted in Aotearoa New Zealand in the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui 
                                                 
 1 Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008 [Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 
2008] (Ecuador) arts 71–4 [tr author]; Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra 2010 [The Law 
of Mother Earth] (Bolivia) No 071, 21 December 2010 [tr author]. See Erin L O’Donnell 
and Julia Talbot-Jones, ‘Creating Legal Rights for Rivers: Lessons from Australia, New 
Zealand, and India’ (2018) 23(1) Ecology and Society 7, 7. See also Gwendolyn J Gordon, 
‘Environmental Personhood’ (2018) 43(1) Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 49.  
 2 In 2010, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania declared nature a legal person. In 2012 the state 
legislature enacted legislation to override this. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
declared this law unconstitutional in Robinson Township v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
52 A 3d 463 (Pa, 2012). See Dinah Shelton, ‘Nature as a Legal Person’ (2015) 15(2) 
VertigO: La Revue électronique en sciences de l’environnement 1. 
 3 Te Urewera Act 2014 (NZ) s 11 (‘Te Urewera Act’).  
 4 Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social ‘Tierra Digna’ v la Presidencia de la República 
(Corte Constitucional) [Colombian Constitutional Court], T-622 Sala Sexta de Revisión, 10 
November 2016, 153; Salim v State of Uttarakhand [2017] SCC OnLine Utt 367 (20 March 
2017) [19] (Rajiv Sharma J, Alok Singh J) (High Court of Uttarakhand). See generally 
Elizabeth Macpherson and Felipe Clavijo Ospina, ‘The Pluralism of River Rights in 
Aotearoa, New Zealand and Colombia’ (2015) 25(6) Journal of Water Law 283. 
 5 The Colorado River Ecosystem, ‘Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint with 
Prejudice’, Submission in The Colorado River Ecosystem v State of Colorado, 17cv02316 – 
NYW, 3 December 2017; Lindsay Fendt, ‘Colorado River “Personhood” Case Pulled by 
Proponents’, Aspen Journalism (online, 5 December 2017) 
<https://www.aspenjournalism.org/2017/12/05/colorado-river-personhood-case-pulled-by-
proponents>, archived at <https://perma.cc/85XZ-GGKV>.  
 6 Chris Walker, ‘Attorney to Withdraw Colorado River Lawsuit under Threat of Sanctions’, 
Westword (online, 4 December 2017) <http://www.westword.com/news/colorado-river-
lawsuit-to-be-withdrawn-due-to-potential-sanctions-9746311>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/3RBH-RW98>. 
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River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) (‘Te Awa Tupua Act’).7 Through this 
Act the Whanganui River (‘the River’) has acquired the rights, duties, powers 
and liabilities of an entity with legal standing including the ability to sue those 
who harm it.8 The River is the third longest in Aotearoa New Zealand.9 It is 
situated in the North Island and stretches for 290 kilometres from the central 
plateau to the sea, starting at Mount Tongariro and flowing south west to the 
coast at Whanganui.10 
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, areas along the River were some of the most 
densely populated by Māori.11 A number of iwi (Māori tribes) had authority over 
the various areas along the River where they lived, depending upon it for their 
very existence.12 After the arrival of Pākehā (Europeans/settlers) and the signing 
of the Te Tiriti o Waitangi (‘Treaty of Waitangi’) in 1840,13 Pākehā understood 
that ownership of the River was no longer vested in the Whanganui iwi.14 
However, Whanganui iwi never relinquished their rights to the River and have 
asserted their claim to it since 1873.15 In 1990 a claim relating to the Whanganui 
River was filed in the Waitangi Tribunal on behalf of the Whanganui iwi.16 The 
Waitangi Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ) 
as a standing commission of inquiry into claims brought by Māori relating to 
                                                 
 7 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 14 (‘Te Awa Tupua 
Act’). For media coverage on this grant of legal personality, see ‘What It Means to Give the 
Whanganui River the Same Rights as a Person’, RNZ (online, 16 March 2017) 
<https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/the-wireless/374515/what-it-means-to-give-the-whanganui-
river-the-same-rights-as-a-person>, archived at <https://perma.cc/L3PP-GX7P>.  
 8 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 14. 
 9 ‘Whanganui’, Lawa (Web Page) <https://www.lawa.org.nz/explore-data/manawatu-
wanganui-region/river-quality/whanganui/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/9R3R-CAS6>. 
 10 Ibid; Diana Beaglehole, ‘Whanganui Places: Whanganui River’, Te Ara: The Encyclopedia 
of New Zealand (Web Page, 15 June 2015) <https://teara.govt.nz/en/whanganui-places/page-
5>, archived at <https://perma.cc/H68X-6X4V>. 
 11 Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Iwi o Whanganui, Whanganui Iwi–Crown, signed 5 
August 2014 (Deed of Settlement) [1.5]. 
 12 Ibid [1.4]–[1.5], [2.27].  
 13 An English translation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 (‘Treaty of Waitangi’) is scheduled to 
the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ) sch 1 (‘Treaty of Waitangi Act’). 
 14 James DK Morris and Jacinta Ruru, ‘Giving Voice to Rivers: Legal Personality as a Vehicle 
for Recognising Indigenous Peoples’ Relationships to Water?’ (2010) 14(2) Australian 
Indigenous Law Review 49, 49. The Treaty of Waitangi (n 13) is considered to be Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s founding document. It was entered into by the Crown and a number of 
Māori chiefs (but not all) to record an agreement as to how Aotearoa New Zealand was to be 
governed. This has been a controversial document because the Māori version of the 
agreement was quite different in meaning to the English version. In particular, the English 
version of the treaty declared that Māori chiefs had ceded sovereignty to the Crown while 
the Whanganui iwi believed that they would continue to have authority over the River and 
live by the principle of kaitiakitanga (guardians/stewards) regarding the natural resources 
that they had always been responsible for and which were important aspects of their lives 
both physically and spiritually. They never believed that they had relinquished kaitiakitanga 
over the River: see Morris and Ruru (n 14) 49. See generally IH Kawharu (ed), Waitangi: 
Māori and Pākehā Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, 1989); 
Matthew SR Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution 
(Victoria University Press, 2008).  
 15 Record of Understanding in Relation to the Whanganui River Settlement, Whanganui Iwi–
Crown, signed 13 October 2011 (Record of Understanding) [1.7]–[1.8]. 
 16 Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Iwi o Whanganui (n 11) [1.13].  
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Crown breaches of the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi.17 Between 2002 
and 2004 negotiations with the Crown took place, although agreement was never 
reached.18 Further discussions took place in 2009 in which the Whanganui iwi 
expressed their overarching wish to ensure the care, protection, management and 
use of the River for the benefit of the River itself, the Whanganui iwi and 
Aotearoa New Zealand.19 
Finally, in March 2017 a settlement between the government and the 
Whanganui iwi was codified in the Te Awa Tupua Act in an effort to address past 
wrongs.20 Although the legislation does not give the Whanganui iwi ownership 
of the River, it records a compromise made between the parties to give the River 
the rights of a legal person enabling it to do all things any entity with legal 
personality can do,21 most importantly, take action to defend itself from harm. A 
truly novel solution to protect a river.22 
On the face of it, the grant of legal personality in this way seems to be an 
innovative legal tool for the enhancement and protection of human rights and in 
particular Indigenous rights. In doing this, the Te Awa Tupua Act reflects the 
cosmovision (worldview) of Indigenous peoples as well as many of the 
provisions and protections that have been afforded to people under international 
                                                 
 17 Treaty of Waitangi Act (n 13) ss 4–6; ‘About the Waitangi Tribunal’, Ministry of Justice, 
New Zealand Government (Web Page, 16 April 2019) 
<https://www.waitangitribunal.govt.nz/about-waitangi-tribunal/>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/J522-85YW>. 
 18 Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Iwi o Whanganui (n 11) [1.18]. 
 19 Ibid [1.3], [1.19].  
 20 Ruruku Whakatupua (The Whanganui River Deed of Settlement) was signed by the New 
Zealand government and Whanganui iwi on 5 August 2014 and is made up of two 
documents: Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua, Whanganui Iwi–Crown, signed 
5 August 2014 (Deed of Settlement) and Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Iwi o 
Whanganui (n 11). The former sets out the establishment of a new legal framework for the 
Whanganui while the latter sets out cultural and financial redress to Whanganui iwi. See 
‘Whanganui Iwi (Whanganui River) Deed of Settlement Summary 5 Aug 2014’, New 
Zealand Government (Web Page, 31 October 2016) <https://www.govt.nz/treaty-settlement-
documents/whanganui-iwi/whanganui-iwi-whanganui-river-deed-of-settlement-summary-5-
aug-2014/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/8SYJ-B99S>. 
 21 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 14. Examples of entities that are legal persons are companies and 
trusts: New Zealand Law Dictionary (6th ed, 2005) ‘legal person’. 
 22 This solution was raised in Alex Frame, ‘Property and the Treaty of Waitangi: A Tragedy of 
the Commodities?’ in Janet McLean (ed), Property and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, 
1999) 224, 237; Morris and Ruru (n 14) 53. This builds on Christopher Stone’s work where 
he argued that natural resources should be given legal personality to enable better 
environmental protection: Christopher D Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? Toward 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45(2) Southern California Law Review 450. See 
also Katherine Sanders, ‘“Beyond Human Ownership”? Property, Power and Legal 
Personality for Nature in Aotearoa New Zealand’ (2018) 30(2) Journal of Environmental 
Law 207; Katie O’Bryan, ‘Giving a Voice to the River and the Role of Indigenous People: 
The Whanganui River Settlement and River Management in Victoria’ (2017) 20(1) 
Australian Indigenous Law Review 48; Jacinta Ruru, ‘Indigenous Restitution in Settling 
Water Claims: The Developing Cultural and Commercial Redress Opportunities in 
Aotearoa, New Zealand’ (2013) 22(2) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 311, 340 
(‘Indigenous Restitution in Settling Water Claims’); Jacinta Ruru, ‘Legal Indigenous 
Recognition Devices’ (2016) 8(26) Indigenous Law Bulletin 26, 28 (‘Indigenous 
Recognition Devices’); Linda Te Aho, ‘Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims 
Settlement) Bill: The Endless Quest for Justice’ (August 2016) Māori Law Review; Abigail 
Hutchison, ‘The Whanganui River as a Legal Person’ (2014) 39(3) Alternative Law Journal 
179.  
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human rights law.23 However, in reality, the Act does not offer significant change 
to the Whanganui iwi’s ability to govern and manage the River; most 
significantly it does not afford the Whanganui iwi ownership of the River. 
This article examines the granting of legal personality to the River under the 
Te Awa Tupua Act in light of international human rights law. The first part 
details the core provisions of the Te Awa Tupua Act focusing on its grant of legal 
personality to the River and the principal limitations within the Act. With this 
background in mind, Part II explores how the Te Awa Tupua Act recognises 
Indigenous peoples and their worldview, in particular the Whanganui iwi, 
through its understanding of the River, its grant of legal personality to the River 
and in turn its scheme of co-governance and co-management. It concludes that 
the Te Awa Tupua Act reflects the ethos of international human rights law 
including its recognition of the close relationship between the protection of 
culture and lands, territories and resources. However, it asserts that the Te Awa 
Tupua Act does not go beyond the recognition of this gloss. Part III then 
demonstrates how the Act’s grant of legal personality fails to afford Indigenous 
peoples with the material protections offered by international human rights law 
in relation to core property rights in light of Māori advocacy for the ownership of 
freshwater. It concludes with an exploration of Aotearoa New Zealand’s failure 
to live up to its human rights commitments by contextualising it within the 
setting of both domestic politics in Aotearoa New Zealand and more broadly that 
of international human rights law. 
II TE AWA TUPUA (WHANGANUI RIVER CLAIMS SETTLEMENT) ACT 2017 
Under the Te Awa Tupua Act, the River is recognised and described as Te 
Awa Tupua.24 Most importantly, the Act declares Te Awa Tupua to be a legal 
person.25 A legal person is defined as ‘[a]n entity on which a legal system 
confers rights and imposes duties’.26 It is usually a natural person or an artificial 
or statutory body, a common example being a company.27 It has rights, duties, 
powers and liabilities including the ability to sue or be sued; in other words, a 
legal person has legal standing.28 The use of legal personality as a tool to confer 
legal standing on natural resources has been used in settlement agreements 
                                                 
 23 See below Parts III(A)(1)–(3). 
 24 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 12.  
 25 Ibid s 14.  
 26 New Zealand Law Dictionary (6th ed, 2005) ‘legal person’.  
 27 Ibid. 
 28 See Morris and Ruru (n 14) 53. 
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between the Crown (New Zealand government) and Māori pertaining to breaches 
of the Treaty of Waitangi.29 
While the use of legal personality appears to provide the River with authority 
and control over itself, in practice its legal rights are limited. This is because the 
Te Awa Tupua Act does not vest ownership of all parts of the River in Te Awa 
Tupua. The only fee simple estate transferred to it is that owned by the 
government, which comprises only parts of the riverbed and the pakohe, gravel, 
sand and shingle in or on the vested land.30 Furthermore, there are existing 
property rights to other parts of the riverbed that remain in private ownership. 
The Te Awa Tupua Act specifically excludes any legal roads, railway 
infrastructure, structures or the riverbed held under the Public Works Act 1981 
(NZ) or located in the marine or coastal area from vesting in Te Awa Tupua.31 
However, the parts of the riverbed that are not owned or held by the Crown (as 
long as it is not Māori land) are able to be transferred to, or vested in, Te Awa 
Tupua (subject to the consent of any other charges or interests in the land).32 
The fact that Te Awa Tupua does not have title to all of its own riverbed is 
curious in light of the fact that under s 12 of the Te Awa Tupua Act, Te Awa 
Tupua is an ‘indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from 
the mountains to the sea’.33 It is the riverbed, riverbanks, plants, animals, fish 
and water. Yet arguably, the most significant limitation on its powers is that it 
does not own the water that is inextricably part of the River. The vesting of parts 
of the riverbed in Te Awa Tupua does not create or transfer a proprietary interest 
in the water because, under common law, water is incapable of being owned.34 
Therefore, even though Te Awa Tupua comprises the Whanganui River, its 
rights of ownership are limited to only parts of the riverbed and not the water. An 
example of this anomaly is that there is no requirement for consent be obtained 
from Te Awa Tupua to use the water.35 Under the Resource Management Act 
                                                 
 29 See Te Urewera Act (n 3) s 11. Such settlement agreements include Ruruku Whakatupua: Te 
Mana o Te Iwi o Whanganui (n 11); Ruruku Whakatupua: Te Mana o Te Awa Tupua (n 20). 
However, with this grant of legal personality, the Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) represents a 
further development in the story of the relationship between the government and Māori 
concerning water management. Previously, co-governance and co-management in relation to 
freshwater had been set out in the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) 
Settlement Act 2010 (NZ) s 35, sch 1 s 4 (‘Waikato-Tainui Act’). Co-governance is reflected 
in the Waikato River Authority which is made up of equal numbers of Crown and iwi 
appointed members who monitor the implementation of the Waikato-Tainui Act: at ss 22–4, 
sch 6 s 2. Co-management is reflected in agreements that provide for the joint management 
by local authorities and Waikato-Tainui: at ss 41–3. 
 30 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 41. Note that the vesting of the pakohe, gravel, sand and shingle 
occurs despite Crown Minerals Act 1991 (NZ) s 11(1).  
 31 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 41(2).  
 32 Ibid s 48(2). This also applies to Māori freehold land: at s 49(1).  
 33 Ibid ss 12, 41. 
 34 Sanders (n 22) 215, 226. Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) ss 16, 46.  
 35 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 46(3). The phrase ‘to use water’ is defined as including ‘to take, 
dam, divert, or discharge into water’: at s 46(4).  
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1991 (NZ) (‘RMA’),36 Te Awa Tupua only may be considered an ‘affected 
person’ for applications for resource consents relating to the water in the River.37 
Beyond ownership, there are further limitations under the Te Awa Tupua Act 
that affect Te Awa Tupua’s ability to fully govern and manage the River. First, 
any existing rights to the River are preserved, including those of private citizens, 
other entities and local authorities: 
• ‘existing public use of, and access to and across, the Whanganui 
River’; 
• ‘existing private property rights’; 
• ‘existing rights of State-owned enterprises and mixed ownership 
model companies’; 
• ‘existing resource consents and other existing statutory 
authorisations’; 
• fishing rights; 
• ‘existing ownership of, and consents for, lawful structures in or on 
any part of the Whanganui River’; 
• ‘statutory functions, powers, and duties of the relevant local 
authorities’; and 
• any other legislation (except as provided for in the Te Awa Tupua 
Act).38 
Secondly, the Te Awa Tupua Act declares any part of the riverbed vested in Te 
Awa Tupua to be a conservation area, a national park or a reserve if those areas 
were designated as such prior to the vesting.39 This means those areas will be 
subject to the law pertaining to such designations which places further 
limitations on Te Awa Tupua’s authority over them. 
Thirdly, the Te Awa Tupua Act limits Te Awa Tupua’s ability to deal with its 
land. The land cannot be alienated by sale, gift, mortgage, charge or transfer.40 
Te Awa Tupua’s right to minerals in or on the land is limited because the Te Awa 
Tupua Act does not affect the government’s ability to own minerals under the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 (NZ) or any lawful rights to subsurface minerals.41 
Furthermore, the provisions of the Te Awa Tupua Act will defer to other 
legislation unless otherwise stated, which also reduces its effectiveness.42 
                                                 
 36 The Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) (‘Resource Management Act’) is a significant 
piece of legislation in New Zealand. Its purpose is ‘to promote the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources’: at s 5(1). 
 37 See ibid s 95E; O’Bryan (n 22) 57. In relation to control over the surface of the water, a 
group comprising iwi, the Department of Conservation, Maritime New Zealand and relevant 
local authorities, has been set up to improve and coordinate the management of activities on 
the water: Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) ss 64(1)–(2). This group must consult Te Pou Tupua and 
report to the relevant government Ministers listed in s 64(6): at s 64(4). 
 38 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 46(2).  
 39 Ibid s 40 initially removes the existing status of the areas prior to vesting, and then s 42 
restores it after vesting.  
 40 Ibid s 43. 
 41 Ibid s 44(2).  
 42 Ibid s 16.  
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III THE TE AWA TUPUA (WHANGANUI RIVER CLAIMS SETTLEMENT) ACT 2017: 
RECOGNISING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
At its core, the Te Awa Tupua Act is about the acknowledgement of the 
significance of the River to the Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand, 
the Māori, and in particular the Whanganui iwi who assert an important 
connection to it. From the beginning, it states its purpose is to record the 
acknowledgements of, and apology by, the government to Whanganui iwi and to 
give effect to the provisions of the deed of settlement between them.43 These 
government acknowledgements and the apology are highly significant and 
important parts of this legislation.44 ‘The Crown acknowledges and respects the 
intrinsic connection between the iwi and hapū of Whanganui and the Whanganui 
River reflected in the Whanganui pepeha, “Ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au”.’45 
The clear intention of the Te Awa Tupua Act is to record the settlement with 
the Whanganui iwi and in doing so provide a legal mechanism to ensure Māori 
have the ability to co-govern and co-manage and thereby protect the River for 
the future of their people.46 The provision covering the Crown’s 
acknowledgement states that  
[t]he Crown acknowledges that through this settlement Whanganui Iwi have 
sought to bring all the iwi, hapū, and other communities of the Whanganui River 
together for the common purpose of upholding and protecting the mana of the 
Whanganui River and its health and well-being for the benefit of future 
generations and, ultimately, all of New Zealand.47 
In its embrace of this anthropocentric framework — a framework which aims 
to reconcile the relationship between Pākehā and Māori — a broader contextual 
reading of the Te Awa Tupua Act demonstrates that its provisions, including the 
grant of legal personality to Te Awa Tupua, flow from recognition of an 
Indigenous worldview. In turn, the Act reflects the ethos of the protections for 
Indigenous peoples entrenched in international human rights law. 
A The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 and the 
Indigenous Cosmovision 
The Te Awa Tupua Act reflects the unique relationship that many Indigenous 
peoples have with nature and their understanding of property which is intimately 
bound up with culture and self-determination, standing in contrast to Western 
conceptions of property. 
1 Western and Indigenous Conceptions of Property 
Property has been described as a ‘category of cardinal importance in the 
common law, around which important politico-philosophical theories have been 
developed’.48 It is suggested that the right to property is the most widely 
                                                 
 43 Ibid s 3.  
 44 Ibid ss 69–70. 
 45 Ibid s 69(3). The translation is ‘I am the river and the river is me’: at s 13(c).  
 46 Ibid s 69.  
 47 Ibid s 69(18).  
 48 Lyndel V Prott and Patrick J O’Keefe, ‘“Cultural Heritage” or “Cultural Property”?’ (1992) 
1(2) International Journal of Cultural Property 307, 309. 
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protected right in domestic legal systems, codified in constitutions throughout 
the world.49 
This widely protected right to property has specific contours shaped by 
Western conceptions dating back to Roman law principles. These were rooted in 
notions of absolute ownership, monetary compensation and the examination of 
acquisition as the defining element of legitimate property.50 In his well-known 
article, AM Honoré described the Western concept of ownership of something as 
comprising a number of liberties, rights, powers and duties.51 Although a number 
of different combinations have been suggested, those traditionally associated 
with ownership in this panoply or ‘bundle’ includes: control of the use of the 
property,52 the right to any benefit from the property, a right to transfer or sell 
the property, a right to exclude others from the property and a right to alienate 
the property.53 Although there is no combination common to all forms of 
property in all situations, implicit in this ‘bundle’ of rights and its extensive 
protection emerges the core features of the Western conception of property. This 
includes that it is an individual and social right, and perhaps most ubiquitously, 
viewed as a commodity.54 Combined with the Western understanding that people 
are considered to be dominant over animals and the environment, this has been 
expressed as the right to own and control nature.55 In turn, this commodification 
served as the justification of many colonisers for confiscating Indigenous lands 
and resources.56 John Locke outlined the quintessential European position of the 
land and resource rights of Indigenous peoples, noting that they had no rights to 
lands and resources that they did not cultivate.57 In turn, it was not viewed as 
                                                 
 49 Karolina Kuprecht, ‘The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Its Potential and 
Limits in the Global Protection of Indigenous Cultural Property Rights’ (2012) 19(1) 
International Journal of Cultural Property 33, 51.  
 50 Ibid 36.  
 51 AM Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in AG Guest (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford 
University Press, 1961) 107.  
 52 In theory, this even extends to the destruction of the property. See Joseph L Sax, Playing 
Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures (University of 
Michigan Press, 1999) discussing whether or not individuals should be allowed to destroy 
cultural treasures.  
 53 See generally Honoré (n 51). It is worth noting that a body of literature is dedicated to the 
critique of this concept of understanding property as a ‘bundle’ including on the grounds 
that ‘Honoré’s taxonomy assumes an integrated conception of property without supplying 
one’: Eric R Claeys, ‘Bundle-of-Sticks Notions in Legal and Economic Scholarship’ (2011) 
8(3) Econ Journal Watch 205, 206. See generally Daniel B Klein and John Robinson, 
‘Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium’ 8(3) Econ Journal 
Watch 193 outlining the arguments for and against understanding property as a bundle of 
rights. Regardless of these critiques and deeper philosophical inquiries, it will suffice herein 
as a useful mechanism to understand the basics of a Western conception of property which 
stands in stark contrast to Indigenous understandings. 
 54 See John R Commons, The Distribution of Wealth (Macmillan, 1893) 92, quoted in Klein 
and Robinson (n 53) 196; John Maurice Clark, Social Control of Business (McGraw-Hill, 
1939) 94, quoted in Klein and Robinson (n 53) 197. See also Alexander A Bauer, ‘New 
Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property: A Critical Appraisal of the Antiquities Trade 
Debates’ (2008) 31(3) Fordham International Law Journal 690, 697. 
 55 Everett V Abbot, Justice and the Modern Law (Houghton Mifflin, 1913) 24–5, quoted in 
Klein and Robinson (n 53) 197. 
 56 See Lindsey L Wiersma, ‘Indigenous Lands as Cultural Property: A New Approach to 
Indigenous Land Claims’ (2005) 54(4) Duke Law Journal 1065, 1065.  
 57 John Locke, The Second Treatise on Civil Government (Prometheus Books, 1986) 102–3, 
cited in Wiersma (n 56) 1065. 
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dispossession but rather as creating economic use out of land and resources that 
were being ‘wasted’ by Indigenous peoples whose land tenure systems did not 
reflect European cultivation patterns.58 
The cosmovision or worldview of Indigenous peoples in relation to property 
is rooted in the interconnectedness of land, resources, culture and self-
determination.59 It stands in contrast to this Western understanding. As 
Alexander Bauer notes, ‘Western notions of property — both “real” and 
“intellectual” — have established a system whereby anything can be isolated, 
decontextualized, packaged for consumption, marketed, and traded — in short 
commodified’.60 Such a notion goes against Indigenous understandings of 
property that assert, ‘[n]o person “owns” or holds as “property” living things. 
Our Mother Earth and our plant and animal relatives are respected sovereign 
living beings with rights of their own in addition to playing an essential role in 
our survival.’61 In essence, for Indigenous peoples ‘property’ represents a 
relationship among human beings, animals, plants and places with which culture 
is associated and economic rights do not take the fore.62 ‘The European concept 
of the natural world, knowledge and culture as “property” (therefore 
commodities to be exploited freely and bought and sold at will) has resulted in 
disharmony between human beings and the natural world’ and the current 
environmental crisis that is threatening all life.63 This concept is ‘incompatible 
with a traditional Indigenous world view’.64 Indeed, private property was not a 
feature of the Indigenous way of life for many Indigenous peoples prior to 
interaction with Europeans. Rather, what emerges from this understanding is a 
different bundle of features that Indigenous peoples associate with property, 
including its collective and intergenerational nature as well as being bound 
closely with culture and self-determination and so the very survival of 
Indigenous peoples.  
                                                 
 58 Wiersma (n 56) 1063, 1065 (citations omitted).  
 59 See ibid 1063–4, 1082; Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: 
Rights, Culture, Strategy (Duke University Press, 2010) chs 5–6; Alexandra Xanthaki, 
Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-Determination, Culture and Land 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 209. 
 60 Bauer (n 54) 697.  
 61 See Xanthaki (n 59) 209, quoting International Indian Treaty Council, Biological Diversity 
and Biological Ethics (Discussion Paper, 30 August 1996) 5. 
 62 See Xanthaki (n 59) 209. 
 63 See International Indian Treaty Council (n 61) 5, quoted in Xanthaki (n 59) 209. 
 64 See International Indian Treaty Council (n 61) 5, quoted in Xanthaki (n 59) 209. 
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2 The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 and 
Indigenous Cosmovision 
The Te Awa Tupua Act reflects this cosmovision of Indigenous peoples — in 
particular the tikanga Māori (Māori custom and values)65 — through its 
understanding of the River, its creation of a model of co-governance and co-
management for the River and finally its recognition of the River as a legal 
person.66 
The Te Awa Tupua Act captures the essence of Te Awa Tupua in the 
provision regarding Tupua te Kawa,67 which must be set out in full to understand 
and appreciate it. Tupua te Kawa encompasses the intrinsic values that represent 
the essence of Te Awa Tupua, specifically: 
Ko Te Kawa Tuatahi 
(a) Ko te Awa te mātāpuna o te ora: the River is the source of spiritual and 
physical sustenance: 
Te Awa Tupua is a spiritual and physical entity that supports and sustains 
both the life and natural resources within the Whanganui River and the 
health and well-being of the iwi, hapū, and other communities of the River. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuarua 
(b) E rere kau mai i te Awa nui mai i te Kahui Maunga ki Tangaroa: the great 
River flows from the mountains to the sea: 
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the 
sea, incorporating the Whanganui River and all of its physical and 
metaphysical elements. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuatoru 
(c) Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am the River and the River is me: 
The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an inalienable connection 
with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its health and well-being. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuawhā 
(d) Ngā manga iti, ngā manga nui e honohono kau ana, ka tupu hei Awa 
Tupua: the small and large streams that flow into one another form one 
River: 
                                                 
 65 The Māori worldview is well documented. See generally Catherine J Iorns Magallanes, 
‘Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the Cosmology that Protects 
the Environment’ (2015) 21(2) Widener Law Review 273; Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa 
Tēnei: A Report into Claims concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori 
Culture and Identity (Wai 262, 2011) (‘Ko Aotearoa Tēnei Report’). For articles that set out 
a Māori worldview applicable to conservation in particular, see Phil O’B Lyver et al, 
‘Building Biocultural Approaches into Aotearoa: New Zealand’s Conservation Future’ 
(2018) (Special Issue: Conservation) Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand 1; 
Sanders (n 22) 211.  
 66 See Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) ss 11, 64, 69. 
 67 Ibid s 13.  
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Te Awa Tupua is a singular entity comprised of many elements and 
communities, working collaboratively for the common purpose of the 
health and well-being of Te Awa Tupua.68 
It is clear that Te Awa Tupua embraces a number of different parts yet is 
considered to be an indivisible single entity by the law. Such beautiful language, 
rare for legislation, reflects tikanga Māori that people are only one part of many 
that nature encompasses in an interdependent world. People are not considered 
dominant in the world; instead all parts co-exist equally. Therefore, natural 
resources cannot be owned.69 Rather, the Whanganui iwi live by the principle of 
kaitiakitanga (obligation to nurture and care).70 They hold a deep respect for the 
nature as they consider it to be their tupuna (ancestor) and as part of this 
relationship they are responsible for its care and protection.71 This principle of 
kaitiakitanga flows from the Māori understanding that the environment is part of 
their broader family. They refer to this as whanaungatanga (kinship) which 
encompasses the relationships between people living and those who have passed 
on, the environment and the spiritual world.72 People do not have rights of 
ownership over their family; instead, the environment must be respected, cared 
for and protected. 
Beyond this understanding of the River, the co-governance and co-
management scheme created by the Te Awa Tupua Act also reflects an 
Indigenous cosmovision. It requires the Whanganui iwi and the government to 
work together to implement and achieve governance over, and management of, 
the River together. It is rooted in Te Pou Tupua, the representative who acts in 
the interests of Te Awa Tupua.73 During the discussion of the Bill in Parliament, 
the Hon David Clendon poetically stated it thus:  
I think it is true to say that any person who sits alongside a river or sits quietly in 
a forest will hear the voice of that river, will hear the voice of that forest. In a 
more pragmatic sense, and a more practical sense, the river will require a human 
voice, and this legislation does allow for that: Te Pou Tupua, the human voice of 
the river.74 
Te Pou Tupua is made up of two people, one acting on behalf of Whanganui 
iwi and one acting on behalf of the government.75 It is responsible for 
administering a fund for the purpose of supporting the health and well-being of 
Te Awa Tupua.76 It has an advisory and strategy group, Te Karewao and Te 
Kōpuka respectively, to provide advice and support to it.77 This office is very 
symbolic — it requires the government and Whanganui iwi to work together to 
                                                 
 68 Ibid. 
 69 See Iorns Magallanes (n 65) 275.  
 70 See Ko Aotearoa Tēnei Report (n 65) 5, 23.  
 71 See Ibid 23. Ruru, ‘Indigenous Restitution in Settling Water Claims’ (n 22) 344. 
 72 See Ko Aotearoa Tēnei Report (n 65) 5, 23; Iorns Magallanes (n 65) 280.  
 73 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) ss 18–19, 64.  
 74 New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 March 2017, 16662 
(David Clendon) (‘Parliamentary Debates 2017’). 
 75 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) ss 20(1)–(2).  
 76 Ibid ss 57–8. The fund is called Te Korotete and is made up of contributions from the Crown 
and other funding sources.  
 77 Ibid ss 27, 29–30.  
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provide a united front in presenting the interests of Te Awa Tupua. Beyond Te 
Pou Tupua, the Te Awa Tupua Act also protects the Māori cosmovision by 
stipulating that only persons knowledgeable about the Act are able to determine 
matters that relate to Te Awa Tupua.78 There is a register of hearing 
commissioners who are persons qualified to hear and determine applications 
under the RMA for resource consents relating to Te Awa Tupua and for activities 
in its catchment that affect it.79 It ensures that the consent authority under the 
RMA must consider any effect on Te Awa Tupua despite any provision to the 
contrary.80 Those included on this register must have skills, knowledge and 
experience in a range of disciplines explicitly including tikanga Māori, 
knowledge of the River and an understanding of Te Awa Tupua.81 
Beyond co-government and co-management, the Te Awa Tupua Act also 
reflects the cosmovision of Indigenous eoples and in particular tikanga Māori 
through its grant of legal personality.82 In making this grant, the Act describes 
the application of this personality to ‘an indivisible and living whole, comprising 
the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating all its physical 
and meta-physical elements’.83 This grant of legal personality recognises the 
normal physical demarcations associated with Western conceptions of property 
and natural resources. Yet significantly it also incorporates tikanga Māori 
through inclusion of the language ‘meta-physical’ which reflects the cultural 
significance of the river and natural resources to Māori. 
[F]or indigenous people, not least of all Māori, there is no such barrier to 
assigning legal rights and agency and personhood to natural objects, because we 
as Māori understand we are linked through whakapapa [genealogy] to our 
mountains, to our rivers, to our moana [ocean], to our forests.84 
In tikanga Māori gods and spirits inhabit the world and all that is in it.85 
Therefore, the environment and its natural resources such as mountains and 
rivers, for example, have not only a physical importance to Māori but also a 
spiritual one. The Māori relationship with water can be described in a number of 
different ways and incontrovertibly one of the ways it can be described is 
cultural.86 The Waitangi Tribunal’s Mohaka River Report notes that for Māori in 
general, water is their taonga (treasure).87 Water is central to identity, life, the 
economy and spirituality.88 In turn, this description and grant of legal personality 
                                                 
 78 Ibid s 20.  
 79 Ibid s 61. 
 80 Ibid s 63. The provisions referred to are ss 95D(e) and 104(3)(a)(ii) of the Resource 
Management Act (n 36).  
 81 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 62(2).  
 82 Ibid s 14. 
 83 Ibid s 12.  
 84 Parliamentary Debates 2017 (n 74) 16662 (emphasis added). 
 85 See above 10–11. 
 86 See ‘Māori Values: In the “Protecting New Zealand’s Rivers”’, Department of 
Conservation: Te Papa Atawhai (Web Page) <https://www.doc.govt.nz/about-us/statutory-
and-advisory-bodies/nz-conservation-authority/publications/protecting-new-zealands-
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Ruru, ‘Indigenous Restitution in Settling Water Claims’ (n 22) 315. See also Resource 
Management Act (n 36) s 6. 
 87 See Waitangi Tribunal, The Mohaka River Report 1992 (Wai 119, 1992) 10–13.  
 88 See ibid; Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 69. 
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incorporates tikanga Māori in relation to water. In fact, in the Te Awa Tupua Act 
the Crown directly 
acknowledges that to Whanganui Iwi the enduring concept of Te Awa Tupua — 
the inseparability of the people and the River — underpins the responsibilities of 
the iwi and hapū of Whanganui in relation to the care, protection, management, 
and use of the Whanganui River in accordance with the kawa and tikanga 
maintained by the descendants of Ruatipua, Paerangi, and Haunui-a-Paparangi.89 
Ultimately, the Te Awa Tupua Act reflects the cosmovision of Māori by 
acknowledging Te Awa Tupua, as a living being, giving recognition to, and 
understanding of, tikanga Māori. Indeed, during the drafting of the Act, co-leader 
of the Green Party, David Clendon, noted: 
I think it is remarkable that this bill does embed one of the fundamental beliefs 
and values of Te Ao Māori: the notion of connectedness with the natural world, 
and human beings as part of it. It embeds that deeply into statute, into New 
Zealand law, in the same way that Te Urewera Act did. I think that as well as 
being significant and important as an empowerment of Te Ao Māori and Māori 
beliefs, it is also a very powerful assertion of tino rangatiratanga, the notion that 
we Māori, as others will, will determine our own futures, and that we should 
allow the non-human elements of our world — in this case, the river — to also 
have a hand and a say in asserting their own futures. This legislation, I believe, 
will lead directly, assuming a happy outcome in terms of implementation, to a 
restoration of the mauri of our largest river, a river that is one of the most 
significant features in this country, and in our cultural world, as well. I would be 
so bold as to quote Gerrard Albert, the negotiator of Ngā Tāngata Tiaki o 
Whanganui, who said that ‘[t]he point is to approximate at law what the river is to 
us in custom and kawa: a living tupuna, not an inanimate, lifeless resource to be 
used without regard to its mana’.90 
B Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 and 
International Human Rights Law: Resources, Land, Culture and Self-
Determination 
Consequently, in its recognition of an Indigenous worldview, the Te Awa 
Tupua Act also reflects the ethos of the increased protections for Indigenous 
peoples entrenched in international human rights law in relation to natural 
resources, land, culture and redress. This synergy represents a sui generis 
approach to resource management and protection which can be justified in light 
of the aforementioned processes of commodification which results in the loss of 
the land, resources and identity of Indigenous peoples.91 
International human rights law increasingly incorporates the cosmovision of 
Indigenous peoples. The most notable example of this incorporation is in the 
principal mechanism for the protection of Indigenous rights under human rights 
law, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
                                                 
 89 Te Awa Tupua Act (n 7) s 69(2).  
 90 Parliamentary Debates 2017 (n 74) 16662. 
 91 On the commodification of land, see above Part III(A)(1). 
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(‘UNDRIP’).92 The UNDRIP was a product of intense negotiation between states 
and Indigenous peoples which lasted over 20 years.93 The overarching agenda of 
the UNDRIP focuses on promoting and protecting the distinctiveness of 
Indigenous peoples in light of the shared historical and ongoing wrongs that they 
have suffered at the hands of dominant society which are typically rooted in 
programs of discrimination and marginalisation.94 In addressing such wrongs and 
providing redress, it is emphasised that the UNDRIP is understood to represent 
the ‘minimum standards’ necessary for the ‘survival, dignity and well-being of 
the indigenous peoples of the world’95 and therefore does not seek to privilege 
Indigenous peoples but to ensure their equality with other peoples.96 It is a 
mechanism ‘to fill a crucial gap’ and ‘to guarantee coherence’ in international 
human rights law which is typified by different approaches to Indigenous claims 
and rights.97 
The UNDRIP scheme for the protection of Indigenous land and natural 
resources is located in arts 25–7.98 Articles 25 and 26(1) detail rights with 
respect to lands, territories and resources in relation to those traditionally owned 
or otherwise occupied and to those historically used that may no longer be 
owned, occupied or used by Indigenous peoples.99 Article 25 recognises the right 
of Indigenous peoples to maintain and strengthen their spiritual relationship with 
such lands, territories and resources and to ‘uphold their responsibilities to future 
generations in this regard’.100 Article 26(1) is broader than art 25, providing that 
‘Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired’.101 
Article 26(2) further provides that  
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
                                                 
 92 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc 
A/Res/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) art 8 (‘UNDRIP’). See 
Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and 
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 93 ‘Historical Overview’, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Web 
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various formal attempts at cultural destruction’: Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: 
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 96 Ibid Preamble para 2.  
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United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58(4) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 957, 959. 
 98 UNDRIP, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (n 92) arts 25–7. 
 99 Ibid arts 25, 26(1). 
 100 Ibid art 25. 
 101 Ibid art 26(1).  
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other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired.102 
Article 27 requires states, in conjunction with Indigenous peoples, to create a 
process to recognise and adjudicate the rights of Indigenous peoples to their 
lands, territories and resources, including those traditionally owned or otherwise 
used or occupied.103 In the context of Aotearoa New Zealand this right is 
fulfilled by the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal. 
As aforementioned, an Indigenous cosmovision understands the intimate 
connection among land, resources, culture and self-determination.104 
Traditionally, international human rights law has not understood nor reflected 
this cosmovision. This can be explained by its history of the relegation of 
cultural rights as well as its adherence to, and incorporation of, a ‘Lockean’ 
understanding of property at the expense of Indigenous peoples until very 
recently.105 However, these provisions of the UNDRIP, in conjunction with the 
following judgements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(‘IACtHR’), represent a sea-change. In recognising not only communal property 
and the restitution of land to Indigenous peoples, but also the inextricable link 
between the protection of Indigenous land and resources and the protection of 
culture, these judgements thereby incorporate this cosmovision. 
In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua, the IACtHR found 
that Nicaragua had violated the right to property enshrined in art 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.106 In doing so, the Court recognised the 
link between culture and the norm of cultural integrity to land, as well as the 
right to property, in particular, the right to property under its Indigenous 
understanding as communal property.107 Flowing from this understanding, the 
State had an obligation to delimit, demarcate and issue titles to the community in 
accordance with their customary law and Indigenous values, uses and customs, 
as well as to abstain from granting further concessions and to provide 
reparations.108 Subsequent decisions of the IACtHR have confirmed the Court’s 
use of the right to property as a tool to secure Indigenous culture and identity, 
and in particular, a right to communal property including reparations for 
violations rooted in recognition and protection of an Indigenous cosmovision. In 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay the IACtHR again found a 
violation of the right to property under art 21.109 Aside from the links among 
land, cultural identity and heritage, which were of importance in finding this 
                                                 
 102 Ibid art 26(2).  
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violation, the Court also emphasised the importance of the broader Indigenous 
cosmovision.110 Building on these cases, in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay the IACtHR explicitly noted that this cosmovision does 
not necessarily correspond to classical Western conceptions of property in terms 
of ideas regarding possession and control; yet this understanding is equally as 
deserving of the equal protection of the law and failure to protect such an 
understanding would make the art 21 right to property ‘illusory for millions of 
persons’.111 In Saramaka People v Suriname, the Court provided that for 
violations of the art 21 right to property there is the possibility of special 
measures to ensure for ‘members of indigenous and tribal peoples the full and 
equal exercise of their right to the territories they have traditionally used and 
occupied’.112 This development was again rooted in recognition of an Indigenous 
cosmovision.113 More recently, in Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v 
Ecuador, the IACtHR laid out the importance of interpreting art 21 as a 
communal property right in line with an Indigenous cosmovision, stressing that 
without such protection, art 21 would have little meaning for Indigenous peoples: 
In other words, the right to use and enjoy the territory would be meaningless for 
indigenous and tribal communities if that right were not connected to the 
protection of natural resources in the territory. Therefore, the protection of the 
territories of indigenous and tribal peoples also stems from the need to guarantee 
the security and continuity of their control and use of natural resources, which in 
turn allows them to maintain their lifestyle. This connection between the territory 
and the natural resources that indigenous and tribal peoples have traditionally 
used and that are necessary for their physical and cultural survival and the 
development and continuation of their worldview, must be protected under Article 
21 of the Convention to ensure that they can continue their traditional way of 
living, and that their distinctive cultural identity, social structure, economic 
system, customs, beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by 
the States.114 
IV TE AWA TUPUA (WHANGANUI RIVER CLAIMS SETTLEMENT) ACT 2017: 
RECOGNISING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS? 
Given its recognition of an Indigenous worldview which reflects the ethos of 
the increased protections for Indigenous peoples entrenched in international 
human rights law in relation to natural resources, land, culture and redress, the Te 
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Awa Tupua Act has received praise at home and abroad.115 Over 200 descendants 
of the Whanganui iwi went to Parliament to witness passage of the Act.116 In its 
Concluding Observations on the Combined Twenty-First and Twenty-Second 
Periodic Reports of New Zealand, regarding the implementation of Aotearoa 
New Zealand’s treaty obligations under the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the United Nations noted 
with praise the adoption of the Te Awa Tupua Act.117 In particular, it applauded 
the government’s efforts to engage and consult with iwi regarding their 
freshwater rights.118 However, in terms of making the substantial gains which 
international human rights law offers Indigenous peoples, the Act falls short. The 
government of Aotearoa New Zealand has been left wanting in its commitments 
under the UNDRIP by failing to offer the Whanganui iwi the ownership of 
freshwater that they have consistently sought.119 
As noted, the UNDRIP provides Indigenous peoples with protections for their 
lands, territories and resources. Article 26(2) offers that ‘Indigenous peoples 
have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and 
resources that they possess’.120 The express wording of this provision is in the 
present tense which suggests that rights in relation to the lands, territories and 
resources no longer under the control of Indigenous peoples, as in art 26(1), 
might be more limited; including limits on the right to return. However, the 
River has been found to be at least in the possession of the Whanganui iwi. In 
effect, this is acceptance, at least in part, of their claim for native title to water. 
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Native title, as understood in the courts of Aotearoa New Zealand, offers: 
On the acquisition of the territory, whether by settlement, cession or annexation, 
the colonising power acquires a radical or underlying title which goes with 
sovereignty. Where the colonising power has been the United Kingdom, that title 
vests in the Crown. But, at least in the absence of special circumstances 
displacing the principle, the radical title is subject to existing native rights.121 
After a long and convoluted history, the doctrine was reintroduced into 
Aotearoa New Zealand in Attorney-General v Ngati Apa.122 The legal test for 
native title requires that Māori have a recognised customary property interest and 
that the government fails to prove that statutory law has clearly and plainly 
extinguished the property right.123 However, the doctrine explicitly foresees the 
possibility of native title as a means to recognise exclusive ownership in land, 
not freshwater.124 Yet, as Jacinta Ruru and the Waitangi Tribunal conclude, this 
doctrine is applicable to the latter, including rivers. According to Ruru, given 
that the purpose of the doctrine is to protect Indigenous peoples’ property, 
limiting it to land would serve no purpose other than farce.125 In the context of 
the Whanganui River, the Waitangi Tribunal accepted such an interpretation and 
ultimately found Māori had ownership of the water.126 The Whanganui River 
Report, which preceded the Te Awa Tupua Act, concluded that the Whanganui 
iwi owned the whole of the Whanganui River ‘inclusive of the water and all 
those things that gave the river its essential life’.127 Relying explicitly on the 
doctrine of native title, the Tribunal reached this conclusion on the grounds that 
Aotearoa ‘New Zealand was not colonised on the basis that rivers were publicly 
owned’.128 In turn, the control of rivers was never vested in the government.129 
Therefore, this guaranteed the Whanganui iwi their continued full, exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of and authority over the river, as affirmed by the Treaty 
of Waitangi.130 As the Whanganui iwi were never dispossessed of these rights in 
the manner envisioned by the Treaty of Waitangi — through ‘free and willing 
disposal’131 — the Whanganui River, inclusive of the water, continued to remain 
in their possession.132 More broadly, in its Stage 1 Report on the National 
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Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claim, the Tribunal noted that, consistent 
with earlier Waitangi Tribunal reports on water, Māori had rights and interests in 
water bodies in 1840 — at the time of the Treaty of Waitangi.133 Furthermore, 
such rights and interests most closely approximated legal ownership, including 
the exclusive right to control access to, and use of, the water.134 Although the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi had significant effects on these rights in that it 
has been understood that Māori have shared their rights to water by the grant of 
non-exclusive use rights to incoming settlers, the fact remains that Māori retain 
residual property rights in water.135 
Although the government has not recognised Māori ownership of water in 
general, the above demonstrates that the Whanganui iwi at least remain in 
possession of the Whanganui River through the doctrine of native title as it 
canvasses a variety of proprietary interests. Indeed, native title ‘encompasses a 
wide spectrum where exclusive ownership falls to the far right’.136 Under 
UNDRIP art 26(2), possession of resources ‘by reason of traditional ownership 
or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired’ entitles Indigenous peoples to ownership.137 As a result, the Te Awa 
Tupua Act does not live up to Aotearoa New Zealand’s commitments under 
international human rights law to the extent that it is solely a grant of legal 
personality. As such it does not vest ownership of the River, understood as the 
water, in any person or group, and so forecloses the possibility of the ownership 
of interests related to the water. This is despite the fact that such ownership is 
open to Indigenous peoples under UNDRIP art 26(2) and has been consistently 
sought by the Whanganui iwi.138 Te Awa Tupua is the physical and metaphysical 
elements of the Whanganui River.139 A river is by definition, ‘a large natural 
stream of fresh water flowing along a definite course’.140 Water is the crucial 
element of a river because without water, there is only a dry channel of land. 
Under the Te Awa Tupua Act, Te Awa Tupua does not have proprietary rights to 
the water, which creates an anomaly because it does not own the very aspect of 
the River that makes it a river: the water. It is like saying that a natural person 
owns his or her skin, but not his or her blood — the life-giving substance. If 
others had a right to use, take or pollute the blood of that person, the 
consequences of those actions could be significant, even leading to death. Te 
Awa Tupua is comprised of the River and yet it has very little control over many 
of the parts that make it whole.141 Although the Western legal device of a grant 
of legal personality is more akin to the Māori worldview of a river as an 
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indivisible whole which has its own ‘life force’,142 this is a major drawback for 
Māori as the ownership of freshwater remains a priority. Indeed Māori have long 
argued for the right to own freshwater and in particular the Whanganui iwi have 
sought ownership of the River.143 In fact, the Whanganui iwi’s claim over the 
River has been the longest running in Aotearoa New Zealand’s history and they, 
like other Māori, often assert their rights in terms of ownership in relation to 
lands, territories and resources.144 The Te Awa Tupua Act acknowledges that 
the iwi and hapū of Whanganui, over many generations since 1840, have 
maintained the position that they never willingly or knowingly relinquished their 
rights and interests in the Whanganui River and have sought to protect and 
provide for their special relationship with the Whanganui River …145 
Many argue that Māori claims to water in terms of ownership have been a 
response to the imposition of Western conceptions of property. However, others 
assert that such ideas of ownership are part of tikanga Māori.146 As James DK 
Morris and Jacinta Ruru note, ‘just because Maori have a personified worldview, 
it is incorrect to assume that they will always favour non-development. Maori do 
not tend to ascribe to a preservation standpoint, but rather a sustainable one’.147 
Regardless of motivation, Māori have consistently responded to this 
commodification by asserting ownership rights. Alex Frame notes the Māori 
reaction in pithy fashion: ‘if it is property, then it is our property!’148 
Ultimately then, Aotearoa New Zealand’s later endorsement of the UNDRIP 
in 2010 and the subsequent passage of the Te Awa Tupua Act in 2017 look less 
like a change of heart rooted in a fundamental commitment to human rights, and 
more like a reflection of settler-states selectively endorsing certain human rights 
that do not ask for, or require, any domestic change.149 Specifically, the Act fails 
to go beyond the current ethos of human rights in its recent embrace of the 
Indigenous cosmovision and claims rooted in culture and identity. It does not 
meet the real demands of Indigenous peoples, in this case for ownership of water 
— a demand that might not fit succinctly into this worldview. The Act’s focus on 
cultural aspects comes at the expense of claims to property and so fails to 
provide the real material gains that human rights law purports to offer Indigenous 
peoples. Consequently, the Act reflects the gloss but not the substance of human 
rights; its bark without its bite. 
The use of legal personality, which ensures that the Te Awa Tupua Act 
adheres to gloss and not substance of human rights, is unsurprising upon 
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examination of the contextual setting of both domestic politics in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, and more broadly the context of international human rights law. As 
regards the former, undoubtedly the Te Awa Tupua Act is part and parcel of the 
settlement process underway in Aotearoa New Zealand. As noted, the settlement 
is mandated by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and is carried out by the 
Waitangi Tribunal.150 A core feature of this process of political settlement 
involves balancing Māori and Pākehā interests. In this case, it is a carefully 
crafted political compromise — achieved through use of legal personality — 
which balances these interests by offering a ‘middle ground between vesting title 
in the iwi and refusing claims to anything other than co-management’.151 In turn, 
it seems likely that we will see the use of legal personality again and again for 
treaty settlements concerning limited resources;152 especially in light of the fact 
that the use of legal personality in particular allows the government to avoid 
addressing the toughest issue in this balancing act: the ownership of 
freshwater.153 At common law, no one owns water — it is publici juris.154 On 
this understanding, water is vested in the government on behalf of the public. 
Aotearoa New Zealand adopted this doctrine from the British on colonisation.155 
The government has consistently maintained this position and reserves for itself, 
and itself alone, the right to grant access to water — in effect acting as the owner 
of all freshwater in Aotearoa New Zealand.156 Using legal personality as a tool 
allows the government to maintain this doctrine while still engaging in the 
process of reparative justice that flows from its commitment under the Treaty of 
Waitaingi. Yet it is the use of this tool that makes such a balancing act vulnerable 
as it leaves the hottest legal issue, and the issue at the heart of any redress, 
unresolved. Indeed, as many Māori note, ‘this issue “must be addressed before 
any major changes to water management can be considered”’.157 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that neither the Ruruku Whakatupua (The 
Whanganui River Deed of Settlement)158 nor the subsequent Te Awa Tupua Act 
reference the UNDRIP. Given that they were negotiated within the framework of 
this settlement process, this omission is a missed opportunity to bolster the 
legitimacy of the UNDRIP and New Zealand’s commitment to it.159 Legitimacy 
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here refers to ‘the quality in international norms that leads states to internalize 
the pull to voluntarily and habitually obey these norms even when it might not be 
in their interest to do so’.160 The legitimacy of norms comes from both their 
substance and the process by which they are made.161 The stakes are high. 
Problems in either substantive and/or procedural legitimacy mean that states are 
less likely to comply with norms.162 Given the legal status of the UNDRIP as a 
declaration and so a non-binding piece of international law, the stakes are even 
higher.163 In turn, the failure of the Crown to reference the UNDRIP within this 
settlement process begins to look like political resistance to international human 
rights law. This demonstrates the adherence of Aotearoa New Zealand to the 
gloss, but not the substance, of such rights. 
As regards the broader context of international human rights law, the use of 
legal personality is unsurprising when we consider the context of broader 
international human rights law. The drafting of the UNDRIP shows that there 
was significant opposition to the idea of restitution in relation to the lands, 
territories and resources of Indigenous peoples.164 This was a major sticking 
point for New Zealand and in part explains why it was not an original signatory 
to the UNDRIP.165 The UNDRIP was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
September 2007. Of the states present, 143 voted in favour, 11 abstained and 
four votes against including the major settler-states of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States.166 New Zealand’s opposition to the UNDRIP 
coalesced around four different themes: land, resources, redress and rights of 
veto.167 Upon adoption of the UNDRIP, the representative from New Zealand 
noted that her State had difficulties with numerous provisions that were deemed 
incompatible with the Treaty of Waitangi, its constitutional and legal 
arrangements, and the principle of good governance for all citizens.168 
Specifically, regarding art 26 (concerning land and resources) and art 28 (on 
redress in instances of lack of prior consent), she offered: 
[T]he provision on lands and resources cannot be implemented in New Zealand. 
Article 26 states that indigenous peoples have a right to own, use, develop or 
control lands and territories that they have traditionally owned, occupied or used. 
For New Zealand, the entire country is potentially caught within the scope of the 
Article. The Article appears to require recognition of rights to lands now lawfully 
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owned by other citizens, both indigenous and non-indigenous, and does not take 
into account the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems of the indigenous 
peoples concerned. Furthermore, this Article implies that indigenous peoples have 
rights that others do not have.  
… 
[T]he entire country would appear to fall within the scope of the Article [28] … 
the text generally takes no account of the fact that land may now be occupied or 
owned legitimately by others or subject to numerous different, or overlapping, 
indigenous claims.169 
V CONCLUSIONS 
The Te Awa Tupua Act offers a platform to explore both the promotion and 
protection of Indigenous rights in international human rights law and in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. This exploration demonstrates that the Act is firmly within the 
ambit of the promotion and protection of Indigenous rights given that it flows 
more broadly from the recognition of the cosmovision of Indigenous peoples, 
which reflects human rights and, in particular, the cultural rights of Indigenous 
peoples. Yet this is where the reflection of human rights ends. The Act translates 
cultural rights but fails to translate the property rights secured for Indigenous 
peoples in international human rights law, leaving Aotearoa New Zealand 
wanting in its commitments under human rights law. Within the domestic 
setting, this inquiry demonstrates that the Te Awa Tupua Act, in its grant of legal 
personality, moves beyond mere ‘window-dressing’ consultation with Māori — 
unlike previous interactions between Māori and Pākehā in the settlement 
process.170 Although this is a step forward, it still fails to secure rights of Māori 
as provided under the Treaty of Waitangi. Ultimately, this demonstrates the 
vulnerability of settlements like the Te Awa Tupua Act to politics and the hurdles 
to implement concrete human rights.  
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